Subject | Re: [Firebird-Architect] TLS |
---|---|
Author | Alex Peshkoff |
Post date | 2010-11-15T15:44:53Z |
On 11/15/10 18:21, Jim Starkey wrote:
sends to the server login (to make server know the hash of password) and
knows password, entered by client. But firebird does not require only
login/password authentication, it already has windows trusted
authentication, where only security context from client is sent to
server and CURRENT_USER name becomes known at server site from OS. With
this schema (rather reliable, BTW, from security POV) client does not
have something to crypt session key.
> On 11/15/2010 6:07 AM, Paul Ruizendaal wrote:Unfortunately this method has one limitation. You suppose that client
>> The most popular API is that of OpenSSL: other implementations tend to use
>> that API as to be an easy substitute. OpenSSL is a big package (1MB
>> binary), a smaller choice is yassl (GPL, 200KB binary):
>> http://www.yassl.com/
>> I guess running the existing FB wire protocol over TLS would fix a lot of
>> concerns. Assuming NimbusDB can't use GPL, yassl sell source code licenses
>> for $5,000.
>>
> There's a licensing problem with yassl and Firebird. Yassl is GPL with
> a FOSS exclusion, but the FOSS exclusion is the MySQL / Oracle FOSS
> exclusion, which has an explicit list of acceptable FOSS licenses.
> Needless to say, neither the IDPL or the IPL are listed. Maybe you
> could talk to Larry Ellison about including Firebird...
>
> As for NimbusDB, I think I'm happy with the client sending a session key
> encrypted with the hash of the password. No additional round trips, no
> expensive RSA encryption, decryption, no man in the middle issue, though
> I'm still pondering the issue.
sends to the server login (to make server know the hash of password) and
knows password, entered by client. But firebird does not require only
login/password authentication, it already has windows trusted
authentication, where only security context from client is sent to
server and CURRENT_USER name becomes known at server site from OS. With
this schema (rather reliable, BTW, from security POV) client does not
have something to crypt session key.